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Abstract
The massive payment card industry (PCI) involves various entities
such as merchants, issuer banks, acquirer banks, and card brands.
Ensuring security for all entities that process payment card infor-
mation is a challenging task. The PCI Security Standards Council
requires all entities to be compliant with the PCI Data Security
Standard (DSS), which specifies a series of security requirements.
However, little is known regarding how well PCI DSS is enforced in
practice. In this paper, we take a measurement approach to system-
atically evaluate the PCI DSS certification process for e-commerce
websites. We develop an e-commerce web application testbed, Bug-
gyCart, which can flexibly add or remove 35 PCI DSS related
vulnerabilities. Then we use the testbed to examine the capability
and limitations of PCI scanners and the rigor of the certification
process. We find that there is an alarming gap between the security
standard and its real-world enforcement. None of the 6 PCI scanners
we tested are fully compliant with the PCI scanning guidelines, issu-
ing certificates to merchants that still have major vulnerabilities. To
further examine the compliance status of real-world e-commerce
websites, we build a new lightweight scanning tool named Pci-
CheckerLite and scan 1,203 e-commerce websites across various
business sectors. The results confirm that 86% of the websites have
at least one PCI DSS violation that should have disqualified them
as non-compliant. Our in-depth accuracy analysis also shows that
PciCheckerLite’s output is more precise than w3af. We reached
out to the PCI Security Council to share our research results to
improve the enforcement in practice.
CCS Concepts
• Security and privacy→Web application security;Web pro-
tocol security.
Keywords
Payment Card Industry; Data Security Standard; Internet Measure-
ment; Website Scanning; Data Breach; Web Security; Testbed; E-
commerce;
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1 Introduction
Payment systems are critical targets that attract financially driven
attacks. Major card brands (including Visa, MasterCard, American
Express, Discover, and JCB) formed an alliance named Payment
Card Industry Security Standards Council (PCI SSC) to standardize
the security requirements of the ecosystem at a global scale. The PCI
Security Standards Council maintains, updates, and promotes Data
Security Standard (DSS) [27] that defines a comprehensive set of
security requirements for payment systems. PCI DSS certification
has established itself as a global trademark for secure payment
systems. According to PCI DSS [27],
“PCI DSS applies to all entities involved in payment card process-
ing – including merchants, processors, acquirers, issuers, and service
providers. PCI DSS also applies to all other entities that store, process,
or transmit cardholder data and/or sensitive authentication data.”
The PCI Security Standards Council plays a major role in eval-
uating the security and compliance status of the payment card
industry participants and supervises a set of entities that are re-
sponsible to perform compliance assessments such as Qualified
security assessors (QSA) and Approved scanning vendors (ASV).
All entities in the PCI ecosystem, including merchants, issuers, and
acquirers, need to comply with the standards. PCI standards specify
that entities need to obtain their compliance reports from the PCI
authorized entities (e.g., QSA and ASV) and periodically submit
the reports in order to maintain their status. For example, a mer-
chant needs to submit its compliance report to the acquirer bank
to keep its business account active within the bank. Similarly, card
issuer and acquirer banks need to submit their compliance reports
to the payment brands (e.g., Visa, MasterCard, American Express,
Discover, and JCB) to maintain their membership status [27].
However, several recent high-profile data breaches [14, 72] have
raised concerns about the security of the payment card ecosystem,
specially for e-commerce merchants1. A research report from Gem-
ini Advisory [21] shows that 60 million US payment cards have
been compromised in 2018 alone. Among the merchants that ex-
perienced data breaches, many were known to be compliant with
the PCI data security standards (PCI DSS). For example, in 2013,
Target leaked 40 million payment card information due to insecure
1Merchants that allow online payment card transactions for selling products and
services are referred to as “e-commerce merchants”.
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practices within its internal networks [72], despite that Target was
marked as PCI DSS compliant. These incidents raise important
questions about how PCI DSS is enforced in practice.
In this paper, we ask: how well are the PCI data security standards
enforced in practice? Do real-world e-commerce websites live up to the
PCI data security standards? These questions have not been exper-
imentally addressed before. We first design and develop testbeds
and tools to quantitatively measure the degree of PCI DSS compli-
ance of PCI scanners and e-commerce merchants. PCI scanners are
commercial security services that perform external security scans
on merchants’ servers and issue certificates to those who pass the
scan. By setting up our testbed, i.e., an e-commerce website with
configurable vulnerabilities, we empirically measure the capability
of PCI scanners and the rigor of the certification process.
Our results show that the detection capabilities of PCI scanners
vary significantly, where even PCI-approved scanners fail to re-
port serious vulnerabilities in the testbed. For 5 of the 6 scanners
evaluated, the reports are not compliant with the PCI scanning
guidelines [19]. All 6 scanners issued certificates to web servers
that still have major vulnerabilities (e.g., sending sensitive informa-
tion over HTTP). Even if major vulnerabilities are detected (e.g.,
remotely accessible MySQL), which should warrant an “automatic
failure” according to the guideline [19], some PCI scanners still
proceed with certification regardless.
Given the weak scanner performance, it is possible that real-
world e-commerce websites still have major vulnerabilities. For
validation, we build a new lightweight scanning tool and perform
empirical measurements on 1,203 real-world e-commerce websites.
Note that for independent researchers or third-parties, scanning in
the PCI context imposes a new technical challenge, namely the non-
intrusive low-interaction constraint. The low interaction constraint,
necessary for testing live production sites, makes it difficult to test
certain vulnerabilities externally. Traditional penetration testing
(pentest) tools are not suitable to test live websites in production
environments. For example, pentest tools such as w3af [4] have
brute-force based tests which require intense URL fuzzing (e.g.,
prerequisite for SQL injection, XSS) or sending disruptive payload.
The feedback from the PCI Security Council during our disclosure
(Section 6) also confirmed this challenge.
Our technical contributions and findings are summarized below.
• We design and develop an e-commerce web application testbed
called BuggyCart, where we implant 35 PCI-related vulner-
abilities such as server misconfiguration (e.g., SSL/TLS and
HTTPS misconfigurations), programming errors (e.g., CSRF,
XSS, SQL Injection), and noncompliant practices (e.g., storing
plaintext passwords, PAN, and CVV). BuggyCart allows us to
flexibly configure vulnerabilities in the testbed for measuring
the capabilities and limitations of PCI scanners.
• Using BuggyCart, we evaluated 6 PCI scanning services, rang-
ing frommore expensive scanners (e.g., $2,995/Year) to low-end
scanners (e.g., $250/Year). The results showed an alarming gap
between the specifications of the PCI data security standard
and its real-world enforcement. For example, most of the scan-
ners choose to certify websites with serious SSL/TLS and server
misconfigurations. None of the PCI-approved scanning vendors
detect SQL injection, XSS, and CSRF. 5 out of the 6 scanners are
not compliant with the ASV scanning guidelines (Section 4).
• We further evaluated 4 generic web scanners (not designed for
PCI DSS), including two commercial scanners and two open-
source academic solutions (w3af [4], ZAP [2]). We examine
whether they can detect the web-application vulnerabilities
missed by PCI scanners. Unfortunately, most of these vulnera-
bilities still remain undetected. (Section 4).
• We conducted empirical measurements to assess the
(in)security of real-world e-commerce websites. We carefully
designed and built a lightweight vulnerability scanner
called PciCheckerLite. Our solution to addressing the non-
intrusiveness challenge is centered at minimizing the number
of requests that PciCheckerLite issues per test case, while
maximizing the test case coverage. It also involves a collection
of lightweight heuristics that merge multiple security tests
into one request. Using PciCheckerLite, we evaluated 1,203
e-commerce website across various business categories. We
showed that 94% of the websites have at least one PCI DSS
violation, and 86% of them contains violations that should have
disqualified them as non-compliant (Section 5). Our in-depth
accuracy analysis also showed that PciCheckerLite’s outputs
have fewer false positives than the w3af counterpart (Table 6).
Based on our results, we further discuss how various PCI stake-
holders, including the PCI council, scanning providers, banks, and
merchants, as well as security researchers, can collectively im-
prove the security of the payment card ecosystem (Section 6). We
open-sourced our BuggyCart 2 testbed and PciCheckerLite 3 in
GitHub, which also include a pre-installed docker image. We are in
the process of sharing BuggyCart with the PCI security council
(Section 3).
2 Background on PCI and DSS
We start by describing the background for the security practices,
workflow, and standards of the current PCI ecosystem that involves
banks, store-front and e-commerce vendors, and software providers.
Then, we focus on how merchants obtain security certifications
and establish trust with the banks. We discuss how the certification
process is regulated and executed.
2.1 Payment Card Ecosystem
The Payment Card Industry (PCI) has established a working sys-
tem that allows merchants to accept user payment via payment
cards, and complete the transactions with the banks in the back-
end. Figure 1 shows the relationships between the key players in
the ecosystem, including users, merchants, and banks. The user
and the merchant may use different banks. The issuer bank issues
payment cards to the user and manages the user’s credit or debit
card accounts (step❶). Users use the payment card at various types
of merchants (steps ❷, ❺, and ❼). The acquirer bank manages an
account for the merchant to receive and route the transaction infor-
mation (steps ❹, ❻, and ❽). The acquirer bank ensures that funds
are deposited into the merchant’s account once the transaction is
complete via the payment network (steps ❾ and ❿). The payment
2Available at https://github.com/sazzad114/buggycart
3Available at https://github.com/sazzad114/pci-checker
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Figure 1: Overview of the payment card ecosystem.
network, also known as the card brands (e.g., Visa, MasterCard),
bridges between the acquirer and the issuer banks.
There are different types of merchants. For merchants that run
an e-commerce service (i.e., all transactions are made online), they
usually interact with the acquirer bank via a payment gateway (e.g.,
Stripe, Square), which eases the payment processing and integration
(❸). For merchants that have a physical storefront, they use point-
of-sale (POS) devices, i.e., payment terminals, to collect and transfer
user card information to the acquirer bank. They can use either the
acquirer bank’s POS (❼) or their own POS (❺). The key difference is
that acquirer POS directly transfers the card information to the bank
without storing the information within the merchant. Merchant
POS, however, may store the card information.
Due to the fact that e-commerce websites and merchant POSes
need to store card information, the merchants need to prove to
the bank that they are qualified to securely handle the information
processing. The acquirer bank requires these merchants to obtain
PCI security certifications in order to maintain accounts with the
bank [11]. Next, we introduce the security certification process.
2.2 PCI Council and Data Security Standard
Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council manages a num-
ber of specifications to ensure data security across the extremely
complex payment ecosystem. Among all the specifications, only
the Data Security Standard (DSS) and Card Production and Pro-
visioning (CPP) are required. All the other specifications (shown
in Table 8 in the Appendix) are recommended (i.e., optional). CPP
is designed to regulate card issuers and manufactures. The Data
Security Standard (DSS) is the most important specification that
is required to be complied by issuer banks, acquirer banks, and
all types of merchants and e-commerce sites, i.e., all systems that
process payment cards. Our work is focused on the DSS compliance.
In the PCI Data Security Standard specifications [27], there are
12 requirements that an organization must follow to protect user
payment card data. These requirements cover various aspects rang-
ing from network security to data protection policies, vulnerability
management, access control, testing, and personnel management.
In total, there are 79 more detailed items under the 12 high-level
requirements. We summarize them in the Appendix (Table 9).
DSS applies to all players in the ecosystem, including all mer-
chants and acquirer/issuer banks. For merchants, they need to ap-
prove their compliance to the acquirer bank to open an account for
Table 1: PCI Compliance levels and their evaluation criteria.
Level Transactions Compliance Requirements
Per Year Self-reportwith SAQ
Sec Scans
by ASV
Sec Audits
by QSA
Level 1 Over 6M Quarterly Quarterly Required
Level 2 1M – 6M Quarterly Quarterly Required/Optional
Level 3 20K – 1M Quarterly Quarterly Not Required
Level 4 Less than 20K Quarterly Quarterly Not Required
their business. For acquirer and issuer banks, they need to prove
their compliance to the card brands (e.g., Visa, MasterCard) for the
eligibility of membership.
We use the merchant as an example to illustrate how DSS com-
pliance is assessed. First, the PCI security standard council provides
the specifications and self-assessment questionnaires (SAQ) [11].
Merchants self-assess their DSS compliance and attach the question-
naires in their reports. Second, the merchant must pass the security
tests and audits from external entities such as Approved Scanning
Vendors (ASV) and the Qualified Security Assessors (QSA). The PCI
council approves a list of ASV and QSA [20] for the assessment.
Security scanning is conducted by certified scanners (Approved
Scanning Vendors or ASVs) on card processing entities. Security
scanning is performed remotely without the need for on-site au-
diting. Not all the requirements can be automatically verified by
the remote scanning (see Table 8 in the Appendix). The PCI council
provides an ASV scanning guideline [19], which details the respon-
sibilities of the scanners (see Table 7 in the Appendix).
Self-assessment questionnaires (SAQs) allow an organization
to self-evaluate its security compliance [29]. In SAQs, all the ques-
tions are close ended. More SAQ analysis is presented in Section 6.
Security audit is carried out by Qualified Security Assessors
(QSAs). It requires on-site auditing (e.g., checking network and
database configurations, examining software patches, and inter-
viewing employees). As security scanning cannot verify all of the
DSS properties, on-site audits are to cover those missing aspects.
Level of compliance varies for different organizations. The com-
pliance level is usually determined by the number of annual fi-
nancial transactions handled by the organization. Each acquirer
bank (or card brand) has its own program for compliance and val-
idation levels. In Table 1, we show the tentative compliance lev-
els that roughly match most of the payment brands [11, 23]. The
self-assessment questionnaires (SAQs) and security scanning are
required quarterly regardless of the compliance levels. Only large
organizations that handle over 1 million transactions a year are
required to have the on-site audit (by a QSA). The majority of
merchants are small businesses, (e.g., 85% of merchants all over the
world have less than 1million USDweb sale [15]). Thus, most online
merchants rely on ASV scanners and self-reported questionnaires
for compliance assessment.
2.3 Our Threat Model and Method Overview
Threat Model. The certification process is designed as an enforce-
ment mechanism for merchants to hold a high-security standard
to protect user data from external adversaries. If the certification
process is not well executed, it would allowmerchants with security
vulnerabilities to store payment card data and interact with banks.
In addition, such security certification may also create a false sense
of security for merchants. We primarily focus on the automatic
server screening by PCI scanners given that all merchants need
to pass the scanning. We also briefly analyze the Self-assessment
Questionnaire (SAQs). Our analysis does not cover on-site audits,
because i) on-site audit is not required for the vast majority of the
merchants and ii) it is impossible to conduct analysis experiments
on on-site audits without partnerships with service providers.
Methodology Overview. To systematically measure and compare
the rigor of the compliance assessment process, our methodology
is to build a semi-functional e-commerce website as a testbed and
order commercial PCI scanning services to screen and certify the
website. The testbed allows us to easily configure website instances
by adding or removing key security vulnerabilities that PCI DSS
specifies. We leverage this testbed to perform controlled measure-
ments on the certification process of a number of PCI scanners. In
addition to the controlled experiments, we also empirically measure
the security compliance of real-world e-commerce websites with a
focus on a selected set of DSS requirements. In the following, we
describe our detailed measurement methodologies and findings.
3 Measurement Methodology
In this section, we describe our measurement methodology for
understanding how PCI scanners perform data security standard
(DSS) compliance assessment and issue certificates to merchants.
The core idea is to build a re-configurable testbed where we can
add or remove key security vulnerabilities related to DSS and gen-
erate testing cases. By ordering PCI scanning services to scan the
testbed, we collect incoming network traffic as well as the security
compliance reports from the scanning vendors. In the following, we
first describe the list of vulnerabilities that our testbed covers, and
then introduce the key steps to set up the e-commerce frontend.
3.1 Security Test Cases
The testbed contains a total of 35 test cases, where each test case
represents a type of security vulnerabilities. Running a PCI scanner
to scan the testbed could reveal vulnerabilities that the scanner can
detect, as well as those that the scanner fails to report.We categorize
the 35 security test cases i1–i35 into four categories, namely network
security, system security, application security, and secure storage.
Note that there are 29 test cases in the first three categories are
within the scope of ASV scanners (i.e., ASV testable cases). The
other 6 cases under “secure storage” cannot be remotely verified.
We include these cases to illustrate the limits of ASV scanners.
(1) Network security (14 test cases). These testing cases are
related to network security properties, including firewall status,
(i1), the access to critical software from network (i2–i4), default
passwords (i5–i6), the usage of HTTP to transmit sensitive data
(e.g., customer or admin login information) (i7), and SSL/TLS
misconfigurations (i12–i18).
(2) System security (7 test cases). These test cases are related to
system vulnerabilities, including vulnerable software (i19–i20),
server misconfigurations (i29–i32), and HTTP security headers
(i33).
(3) WebApplication security (8 test cases). These test cases are
related to application-level problems including SQL injections
(i21–i22), not following secure password guidelines (i23–i24),
the integrity of Javascripts from external sources (i25), revealing
crash reports (i26), XSS (i27) and CSRF (i28).
(4) Secure storage (6 test cases). Secure storage is impossible to
verify through external scans. Thus, DSS does not require PCI
scanners to test these properties, such as storing sensitive user
information (i8), storing and showing PAN in plaintext (i9–i11),
and insecure ways of storing passwords (i34–i35). In PCI DSS,
merchants need to fill out the self-assessment questionnaire
about how they handle sensitive data internally. We choose to
include these vulnerabilities in the testbed for highlighting the
fundamental limitations of external scans on some important
aspects of server security.
Must-fix Vulnerabilities. These test cases are designed following
the official ASV scanning guideline [19] and the PCI data security
standard (DSS) [27]. Among the 35 cases, 29 are within the scope
(responsibility) of ASV scanners that can be remotely tested. After
vulnerabilities are detected, website owners are required to fix any
vulnerabilities that have a CVSS score ≥ 4.0, and any vulnerabil-
ities that are marked as mandatory in PCI DSS. CVSS (Common
Vulnerability Scoring System) measures the severity of a vulner-
ability (score 0 to 10). The CVSS scores in Table 3 are calculated
using CVSSv3.0 calculator [1]. Vulnerabilities that have no CVSS
score are marked as “N/A”. If the website owner fails to resolve the
“must-fix” vulnerabilities, a scanner should not issue the compliance
certification. As shown in Table 3, 26 out of the 29 testable cases are
required to be fixed. Three cases (vulnerability 3, 4, and 18) are not
mandatory to fix. For example, exposing OpenSSH to the Internet
(case-3) does not mean immediate danger as long as the access is
well protected by strong passwords or SSH keys.
Completeness and Excluded Cases.When building our Buggy-
Cart testbed and the PciCheckerLite prototype, we exclude five
mandatory ASV scanning cases: i) backdoors or malware, ii) DNS
server vulnerabilities, e.g., unrestricted DNS zone transfer, iii) vul-
nerabilities in mail servers, iv) vulnerabilities in hypervisor and
virtualization components, and v) vulnerabilities in wireless access
points. Most of them (namely, ii, iii, iv, and v) are not relevant, as
they involve servers or devices outside our testbed or an applica-
tion server. In the first category, it is difficult to design a generic
network-based testing case. We also exclude the non-mandatory
cases (shown in the last 4 rows of Table 7 in the Appendix).
Note that ASV testable cases only represent a subset of PCI DSS
specifications [27] because some specifications are not remotely
verifiable. There are specifications related to organization policies,
which are impossible to verify externally, e.g., “restricting physical
access to cardholder data” (DSS req. 9), and “documenting the key
management process” (DSS req. 3.6). They can only be assessed
by onsite audits, which unfortunately are not applicable to the
majority of e-commerce websites and small businesses (see Table 1).
We will discuss this further in Section 6.
Our PciCheckerLite prototype in Section 5 scans 17 test cases
in Table 5, which are a subset of the 29 externally scannable rules in
Table 3. When scanning live production websites, we have to elimi-
nate cases that require intrusive operations such as web crawling,
URL fuzzing, or port scanning.
3.2 Testbed Architecture and Implementations
A key challenge of measuring PCI scanners is to interact with PCI
scanners like a real e-commerce website does, in order to obtain
reliable results. This requires the testbed to incorporate most (if not
all) of the e-commerce functionality to interact with PCI scanners
and reflect the scanners’ true performance. For this reason, we
choose the OpenCart [26] as the base to build our testbed. OpenCart
is a popular open source PHP-based e-commerce solution used
by real-world merchants to build their websites. This allows us
to interact with PCI scanners in a realistic manner to ensure the
validity of measurement results.
Testbed Frontend. The frontend of our testbed supports core e-
commerce functionality, such as account registration, shopping cart
management, and checkout and making payment with credit cards.
The code of the website4 is based on OpenCart. We rewrote the
OpenCart system by integrating all 35 security vulnerabilities and
testing cases. We deployed the website using Apache HTTP server
and MySQL database. Our testbed automatically spawns a website
instance following a pre-defined configuration. We used OpenSSH
as the remote access software and Phpmyadmin to remotelymanage
the MySQL database. We hosted our website in Amazon AWS in a
single t2.medium server instance with Ubuntu 16.04. We obtained a
valid SSL certificate to enable HTTPS from Let’s Encrypt [25].
We set up the website solely for research experiment purposes.
Thus, it does not have a real payment gateway. Instead, we set up a
dummy payment gateway that imitates the real gateway Cardcon-
nect [22]. The website forwarded credit card transactions to this
dummy payment gateway. The dummy endpoint for Cardconnect
is implemented using flask-restful framework. We modified the
/etc/hosts file of our web server to redirect the request. During
our experiments, our server did not receive any real payment trans-
action requests. We further discuss research ethics in Section 3.3.
Implementing Security Test Cases. Next, we describe the im-
plementation details of the 35 security test cases in Table 3.
For the network security category, we implement test cases i1 to
i3 by changing inbound traffic configurations within the Amazon
AWS security group. Test case i4 (administer access over Internet) is
implemented by changing phpmyadmin configuration. For test case
i5 (default SQL password), we do not set any password for “root”
and enable access from any remote host. Test case i5 is implemented
by configuring phpmyadmin (no password for user “root”). Test
case i7 is set to keep port 80 (HTTP) open without a redirection to
port 443 (HTTPS). Test cases i12, i14, i16, and i17 are implemented
by using default certificates from Apache. Test cases i13 and i18 are
implemented by changing SSLCipherSuite and SSLProtocol of the
Apache server. For test case i15, we configure the Apache server to
use a valid certificate but with a wrong domain name.
For the system security category, we implement test cases i19–
i20 by installing software that are known to be vulnerable. For
test case i19, we use OpenSSL 7.2, which is vulnerable to privilege
escalation and timing side channel attacks. For test case i20, we
used phpmyadmin 4.8.2 which is known to be vulnerable to XSS. We
implemented test cases i29 to i33 by changing the configurations
of the Apache server. For test case i33 (HTTP security header)
4The URL was www.rwycart.com. We took the site offline after the experiment.
in particular, we consider X-Frame-Options, X-XSS-Protection, X-
Content-Type-Options, and Strict-Transport-Security.
For the web application security category, we implement test
cases i21 to i28 by modifying OpenCart source code [26]. Regarding
secure password guidelines, we disable password retry restrictions
for both users and administrators (test case i23), disable the length
checking of passwords (test case i24). For SQL injection, we modify
the admin login (test case i21) and customer login (test case i22)
code to implement SQL injection vulnerabilities. For admin login,
we simply concatenate user inputs without sanitation for the login
query. For the customer login, we leave an SQL injection vulner-
ability at the login form. Given that the user password is stored
as unsalted MD5 hashes, we run the login query by concatenating
the MD5 hash of the user-provided password, which is known to
be vulnerable to SQL injection [5]. For XSS and CSRF, we implant
an XSS vulnerability in the page of editing customer profiles, by
allowing HTML content in the “first name” field (test case i27). By
default, Opencart does not have any protection against CSRF (test
case i28). For test case i26 (displaying errors), we configure Open-
Cart to reveal crash reports (an insecure practice, which gives away
sensitive information). Opencart by default does not check the in-
tegrity of Javascript code loaded from external sources (test case
i25).
For the secure storage category, we modify the Cardconnect
extension to store CVV in our database (test case i8) and the full
PAN (instead of the last 4 digits) in the database in plaintext (test
case i10). We add an option to encrypt PANs before storing, but
the encryption key is hardcoded (test case i11). We also update the
customers’ order history page to show the unmasked PAN for each
transaction (test case i9). Finally, the testbed stores the raw unsalted
MD5 hash of passwords for customers (test case i34) and plaintext
passwords for admins (test case i35).
3.3 Research Ethics
We have taken active steps to ensure research ethics for our mea-
surement on PCI scanners (Section 4). Given that our testbed is
hosted on the public Internet, we aim to prevent real users from
accidentally visiting the website (or even putting down credit card
information). First, we only put the website online shortly before
the scanning experiment. After each scanning, we immediately
take down the website. Second, the website domain name is freshly
registered. We never advertise the website (other than giving the
address to the scanners). Third, we closely monitor the HTTP log of
the server. Any requests (e.g., for account registration or payment)
that are not originated from the scanners are dropped. Network
traffic from PCI scanners are easy to distinguish (based on IP and
User-Agent) from real user visits. We did not observe any real user
requests or payment transactions during our experiments.
All PCI scanners run automatically without any human involve-
ment from the companies. We order and use the scanning services
just like regular customers. We never actively generate traffic to
the scanning service, and thus our experiments do not cause any
interruptions. Our experiments follow the terms and conditions
specified by the scanning vendors, which we carefully examined.
We choose to anonymize the PCI scanners’ names since some scan-
ning vendors strictly forbid publishing any benchmark results. We
argue that publishing our work with anonymized scanner names is
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Figure 2: Illustration of the baseline scanning and the certi-
fied version. A PCI scanner iteratively scans the testbed. The
initial scan (baseline) is on the original testbed with all 35
vulnerabilities. The certified version is the testbed version
where the testbed successfully passes the scanning after we
iteratively fix a minimal set of vulnerabilities in the testbed.
In Table 3, we report the scanning results on both versions
of the testbed for each scanner.
sufficient for the purpose of describing the current security practice
in the payment card industry, as the security issues reported are
likely industry-wide, not unique to the individual scanners eval-
uated. In addition, anonymization would help alleviate the bias
toward individual scanners and potential legal issues [54].
In Section 5, we also carefully design our experiments when
evaluating the compliance of 1,203 websites. The experiment is
designed in a way that generates minimal footprints and impact on
the servers, in terms of the number of connection requests to the
servers. Our client is comparable to a normal client and does not
cause any disruption to the servers. For example, we quickly closed
the connection, after finding out whether or not an important port
is open. More details are be presented in Section 5.
4 Evaluation of PCI Scanners
Our first set of experiments is focused on evaluating PCI scanners
to answer the following research questions. Later in Section 5, we
will introduce our second set of experiments on measuring the
security compliance of real-world e-commerce websites.
• How do various PCI scanners compare in terms of their detec-
tion capabilities? (Section 4.1)
• What are the security consequences of inadequate scanning
and premature certification? (Section 4.2)
• How are web scanners (commercial or open-source ones) com-
pared with PCI scanners in terms of detection capabilities?
(Section 4.3)
We selected 8 U.S. based PCI DSS scanners as shown in Table 2.
The selection process is as follows. From the list of approved ven-
dors [20]5, we found 85 of them operate globally. Out of these 85,
we aimed to identify a set of ASVs that appear to be of high quality
(e.g., judging from the company’s reputations and websites) and
5As of April 30, 2019, 97 companies are approved by the PCI Council as the approved
scanning vendors (ASVs) [20].
Table 2: Prices of PCI scanners and the actual costs.
PCI Scanners Price Spent Amount PCI SSC Approved?
Scanner1 $2,995/Year $0 (Trial) Yes
Scanner2 $2,190/Year $0 (Trial) Yes
Scanner3 $67/Month $335 No
Scanner4 $495/Year $495 Yes
Scanner5 $250/Year $250 Yes
Scanner6 $59/Quarter $118 No
Scanner7 Unknown N/A Yes
Scanner8 $350/Year N/A Yes
Total - $1198 -
somewhat affordable (due to our limited funding), while also cov-
ering different price ranges. We identified 6 such scanners. For 3
of them, the prices are publicly available. For the other 3 scanners,
we emailed them through our rwycart.com email addresses. 2 of
them (Scanner7 and Scanner8) did not provide their price quota-
tions, which forced us to drop them from our evaluation (due to our
organization policies). During our search, we also found that some
website owners used non-ASV scanners. Thus, we also included
2 non-ASVs that have good self-reported quality. Non-approved
scanners offer commercial PCI scanning services, but are not on the
ASV list [20] of the PCI council6. Because of the legal constraints
imposed by the terms and conditions of scanners, we cannot reveal
scanners’ names. Researchers who wish to reproduce or extend our
work for scientific purposes without publishing scanner names are
welcome to contact the authors.
We conducted experiments successfully with 6 of the scanners
(without Scanner7 and Scanner8 for the reason mentioned above).
We use the email address (wayne@rwycart.com) associated with
the testbed e-commerce website to register accounts at the scanning
vendors. Table 2 shows the prices of these 6 vendors. For Scanner2
and Scanner1, we completed our experiments within the trial period
(60 days for Scanner2 and 30 days for Scanner1). The trial-version
and the paid-version offer the same features and services.
Iterative Test Design. Given a PCI scanner, we carry out the eval-
uation in two high-level steps shown in Figure 2. Every scanner
first runs on the same baseline testbed with all the vulnerabili-
ties built in. Then we remove a minimal set of vulnerabilities to
get the testbed certified for PCI DSS compliance. The final certi-
fied instance of the testbed may be different for different scanners,
as high-quality scanners require more vulnerabilities to be fixed,
having fewer remaining (undetected) vulnerabilities on the testbed.
(1) Baseline Test.We spawn a website instance where all 35 vul-
nerabilities are enabled (29 of them are remotely verifiable).
Then we order a PCI scanning service for this testbed. During
the scanning, we monitor the incoming network traffic. We
obtain the security report from the scanner, once the scanning
is complete.
(2) Certified Instance Test.After the baseline scanning, we mod-
ify the web server instance according to the obtained report.
We perform all the fixes required by the PCI scanner and order
6To become an ASV, a scanner service needs to pay a fee and go through a testbed-based
approval evaluation supervised by the PCI Council.
Table 3: Testbed scanning results. “Baseline” indicates the scanning results on our testbed when all the 35 vulnerabilities are
active. “Certified” indicates the scanning results after fixing the minimum number of vulnerabilities in order to be compliant.
“#”, “G#”, “ ”means severity level of low,medium, and high respectively according to the scanners. “✗”mean “undetected”, “✓”
means “fixed in the compliant version”, “✓∗” means “fixed as a side-effect of another case”. The “website scanners” represent
a separate experiment to determine whether website scanners can help to improve coverage. We ran the website scanners
on test cases that were not detected by the PCI ASV scanners. “N/A” means "not testable by an external scanner". “-” means
"testable but do not need to tested". The "Must Fix" column shows the vulnerabilities that must be fixed by the e-commerce
websites in order to be certified as PCI DSS compliant.
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1.1 1. Firewall detection OS Y N/A Y # # # # # # ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ - - - -
1.2
2. Mysql port (3306) detection OS Y N/A Y  ✓ G# ✓ # # # # # # - - - -
3. OpenSSH detected OS Y N/A N G# ✓ # # # # # # # # - - - -
4. Remote access to Phpmyadmin Apache Y N/A N G# ✓ # # # # # # # # - - - -
2.1 5. Default Mysql user/password Mysql Y 8.8 Y  ✓ # ✓∗  ✓  ✓  ✓ - - - -
6. Default Phpmyadmin passwords Apache Y 8.8 Y ✗ ✓∗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ # # ✗ ✗ - - - -
2.3 7. Sensitive information over HTTP Apache Y 8.1 Y ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
3.2 8. Store CVV in DB Webapp N N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
3.3 9. Show unmasked PAN Webapp N N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
3.4 10. Store plaintext PAN Webapp N N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
3.5 11. Hardcoded key for encrypting PAN Webapp N N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
4.1
12. Use untrusted selfsigned cert. Apache Y 9.8 Y G# ✓ G# ✓ G# ✓ G# ✓ ✗ ✗ - - - -
13. Insecure block cipher (Sweet32) Apache Y 7.5 Y G# ✓ G# ✓ # # G# ✓ ✗ ✗ - - - -
14. Expired SSL cert. Apache Y 5.3 Y G# ✓ G# ✓  ✓ G# ✓ ✗ ✗ - - - -
15. Wrong domain names in cert. Apache Y 5.3 Y G# ✓ ✗ ✗ # # # # ✗ ✗ - - - -
16. DH modulus <= 1024 Bits Apache Y 5.3 Y # ✓∗ G# ✓ G# ✓ G# ✓ ✗ ✗ - - - -
17. Weak Hashing in SSL cert. Apache Y 5.3 Y G# ✓ ✗ ✓∗ ✗ ✓∗ G# ✓ ✗ ✗ - - - -
18. TLS 1.0 supported Apache Y 3.7 N  ✓  ✓ G# ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ - - - -
6.1 19. Vulnerable OpenSSH (7.2) OS Y 7.8 Y  ✓  ✓  ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ - - - -
20. Vulnerable Phpmyadmin (4.8.3) Apache Y 6.5 Y G# ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ - - - -
6.5
21. Sql inject in admin login Webapp Y 9.8 Y ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
22. Sql inject in customer login Webapp Y 9.8 Y ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓
23. Disable password retry limit Webapp Y 5.3 Y ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
24. Allow passwords with len <8 Webapp Y 5.3 Y ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
25. Javascript source integrity check Webapp Y 9.8 Y  ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ - - - -
26. Don’t hide program crashes Webapp Y 6.5 Y ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
27. Implant XSS Webapp Y 6.1 Y ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
28. Implant CSRF Webapp Y 8.8 Y G# ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ - - - -
6.6
29. Extraction of server info. Apache Y 5.3 Y G# ✓ # # # # # # # # - - - -
30. Browsable web directories Apache Y 7.5 Y G# ✓ G# ✓ G# ✓ G# ✓ G# ✓ - - - -
31. HTTP TRACE/TRACK enabled Apache Y 4.3 Y G# ✓ G# ✓  ✓ G# ✓  ✓ - - - -
32. phpinfo() statement is enabled Apache Y 5.3 Y G# ✓ G# ✓ # #  ✓ ✗ ✗ - - - -
33. Missing security headers in HTTP Apache Y 6.1 Y G# ✓ G# ✓ G# ✓ # # ✗ ✗ - - - -
8.4 34. Store unsalted customer passwords Webapp N N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
35. Store plaintext passwords Webapp N N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Baseline: #Vul. Detected (Total detectable: 29) 21 - 16 - 17 - 16 - 7 - - - - -
Certified: #Vul. Remaining (#Vul. detected, but no need to fix) - 7(0) - 15(3) - 18(7) - 20(7) - 25(4) - - - -
another round of scanning. The purpose of this round of scan-
ning is to identify theminimal set of vulnerabilities that need to
be fixed in order to pass the PCI DSS compliance certification.
In summary, we perform the following steps for each scanner: i)
implant vulnerabilities under each test case in the testbed, ii) run
the PCI scanning, iii) fix all the vulnerabilities that the scanner man-
dates to fix in order to be PCI DSS compliant, iv) run the scanning
again, and v) record the certified version of the testbed.
4.1 Comparison of Scanner Performance
We found that the security scanning capabilities vary significantly
across scanners, in terms of i) the vulnerabilities they can detect
and ii) the vulnerabilities they require one to fix in order to pass
the certification process. Once passed, the website becomes PCI
DSS compliant. The experimental results are presented in Table 3.
Scanner2. Scanner2 is the most effective PCI scanner in our evalua-
tion, and successfully detected 21 out of the 29 externally detectable
cases. The most important case that Scanner2 missed is the use of
HTTP protocol to transmit sensitive information (test case 7). We
fixed 21 vulnerabilities in our testbed to become PCI compliant in
Scanner2. Most of the fixes are intuitive, except fixing Javascript
source integrity checking (Case 25) and CSRF (Case 28). We added
Javascript integrity checking for scripts that are loaded from exter-
nal sources (Case 25). We used a dynamic instrumentation based
plugin to protect OpenCart against CSRF attacks (Case 28). This plu-
gin instruments code for generating and checking of CSRF tokens
in OpenCart forms. Sometimes, fixing one vulnerability effectively
eliminates another vulnerability that Scanner2 fails to detect. For
example, Scanner2 did not detect default usernames and passwords
for Phpmyadmin (Case 6); however, this vulnerability no longer
exists after we disable the remote access to Phpmyadmin (Case 4).
Scanner5. In the baseline test (i.e., when all the vulnerabilities
were in place), Scanner5 detected 16 out of the 29 cases. To obtain
a Scanner5 compliant version, we had to fix 13 vulnerabilities. Two
of the vulnerabilities (Test cases 5 and 17) are fixed as a side effect
of fixing other vulnerabilities (Test cases 2 and 12). Scanner5 failed
to report the use of a certificate with the wrong hostname, which
is a serious vulnerability exploitable by hackers to launch man-
in-the-middle attacks. Scanner5 did not report the use of HTTP
to transmit sensitive information (i.e., login and register forms in
rwycart). Interestingly, Scanner5 detected the use of HTTP to log
on to PhpMyAdmin. In addition, Scanner5 did not report the use of
scripts from external sources (Case 25).
Scanner1 and Scanner4. Scanner4 uses Scanner1’s scanning in-
frastructure for ASV scanning. So we present the experimental
results of both scanners under the same column. Scanner1 detects
17 vulnerabilities. However, it only requires fixing 10 of them to be
PCI DSS compliant. Some of the high and medium severity vulnera-
bilities are not required to fix, including remotely accessible Mysql
(Case 2), certificates with wrong hostnames (Case 15), and missing
security headers (Case 33). The vulnerability of weak hashing in
SSL/TLS certificates (Case 17) was fixed as a side effect of using a
real certificate from Let’s Encrypt (Case 12).
Scanner6 and Scanner3. Scanner6 and Scanner3 are not on the
approved scanning vendors (ASVs) list [20] provided by the PCI
council. Compared with other approved scanners, they detected a
fewer number of vulnerabilities. Scanner6 detected 16 vulnerabili-
ties, whereas Scanner3 detected 7. We fixed 9 of the vulnerabilities
for Scanner6 and 3 for Scanner3 in order to be compliant. Both Scan-
ner6 and Scanner3 detected remotely accessible Mysql (Case 2), but
do not require us to fix them. Scanner3 missed all the SSL/TLS and
certificate related vulnerabilities (Test cases 12-18), while Scanner6
detected most of them. However, Scanner6 did not require us to
fix certificates with wrong hostnames (Test case 15). We cannot
conclude that unapproved scanners perform worse than approved
scanners, due to the small sample size.
ACase Study of False Positives. During our experiment, we find
Scanner2 produced a false positive under the SQL injection test.
Scanner2 recently incorporated an experimental module to find
blind SQL detection, by sending specially crafted parameters to
the web server. If the server returns different responses, then it
determines that the server has accepted and processed the parame-
ter (a.k.a vulnerable). However, this detection procedure fails on
a common e-commerce scenario: supporting multiple currencies.
OpenCart allows users to select the currency for a product. If a
currency is clicked, it updates the currency of the current page. The
server records all the parameters of the current page under a hid-
den field so that it can recreate the page later (Listing 1). Note that
Scanner2’s specially-crafted parameters are also recorded, which
makes Scanner2 believe that there exists a difference in the output
under different values of the parameter, which is actually a false
positive. Nevertheless, we fixed it by changing the BuggyCart
code to be certified by Scanner2.
Listing 1: The difference in the output after injecting a pa-
rameter named name with an empty value “” vs. “yy”.
< input type= " hidden " name= " r e d i r e c t "
value= " h t t p : / /www. rwycar t . com / up load
/ index . php ? . . . & amp ; p r odu c t _ i d =49&amp ; name= " / >
−−−−−−−− vs −−−−−−−−
< input type= " hidden " name= " r e d i r e c t "
value= " h t t p : / /www. rwycar t . com / up load
/ index . php ? . . . & amp ; p r odu c t _ i d =49&amp ; name=yy " / >
Network Traffic Analysis. We collected the incoming network
requests from each of the scanners using the access log of our
testbed. During the baseline experiment, Scanner5, Scanner6 and
Scanner3 sent 23,912, 39,836, and 31,583 requests, respectively and
finished within an hour. Scanner4 and Scanner1 sent 147,038 re-
quests and took more than 3 hours to finish. Scanner2 sent 64,033
requests within 2.5 hours. The reason why we received such a
high traffic volume is that the PCI scanners were attempting to
detect vulnerabilities such as XSS, SQL injection that require in-
tensive URL fuzzing, crawling and parameter manipulations. This
confirms that the PCI scanners have at least attempted to detect
such vulnerabilities but were just unsuccessful.
4.2 Impacts of Premature Certification
Some scanners choose to simply report vulnerabilities without
marking the e-commerce website as non-compliant. Below, we
discuss the security consequences of premature certifications. Some
of the incomplete scanning and premature certification issues can
be prevented, if the scanners follow the ASV guidelines [19].
Network Security Threats.According to the ASV scanning guide-
line, SSL/TLS vulnerabilities (Test cases 12–17) should lead to auto-
matic failure of certification, which is clearly necessary due to the
man-in-the-middle threats. Only Scanner2 detected all these cases.
Scanner3 does not detect any of these SSL/TLS vulnerabilities. In
addition, a website should be marked as non-compliant if sensitive
information is communicated over HTTP (Test case 7). However,
none of the ASV scanners detected this issue in our testbed. This
vulnerability can be avoided by configuring the server to automati-
cally redirect all the HTTP traffic to HTTPS. Because none of the 6
scanners detected this vulnerability, it is likely that this HTTP issue
exists on real-world e-commerce websites. Our later evaluation on
1,203 websites that process online payment shows 169 of them do
not redirect their HTTP traffic to HTTPS (Section 5).
Our Test case 2 embeds a database access vulnerability, allowing
the database to be accessible from the Internet. All the scanners
detected this vulnerability. However, only Scanner2 and Scanner5
mark this issue as an automatic failure (i.e., non-compliant). The
other scanners report it as “low/information”, not as a required
fix, despite the ASV scanning guideline [19] recommends that to
be marked as non-compliant. Our evaluation later on websites
that accept payment card transactions shows that 59 out of 1,203
websites opened the Mysql port (3306) to the Internet (Section 5).
System Security Threats. The ASV scanning guideline [19] sug-
gests to test and report vulnerable remote access software. 4 out of
the 6 scanners detected vulnerable OpenSSH software (Test case 19).
Under Test case 20, only Scanner2 detected vulnerable phpmyad-
min, while others failed. Although all scanners noticed the Test
case 29 (extracted server information), only Scanner2 required a fix
for compliance. The ASV scanning guideline [19] also recommends
reporting automatic failure if browsable web directories are found
(Test case 30). All scanners detected this vulnerability. Scanner6
detected missing security headers (Test case 33), but did not ask us
to fix it, while Scanner3 failed to detect it.
Web Application Threats. The scanners’ performance is partic-
ularly weak for this category. Out of the 8 test cases, only 2 were
detected by Scanner2 (tampered Javascript and CSRF). None of the
cases was detected by other PCI scanners.
4.3 Evaluation of Website Scanners
The above results suggest that some web application vulnerabilities
are difficult to detect. The follow-up question is, can specialized
website scanners detect these vulnerabilities? To answer this ques-
tion, we ran four website scanners on our BuggyCart testbed,
including two commercial ones (from Scanner2 and Scanner5) and
two open source scanners (w3af [4] and ZAP [2]). w3af and ZAP
are state-of-the-art open source web scanners, are actively being
maintained and are often used in academic research [49, 50, 67].
The two commercial web scanners are from reputable companies.
Scanner2W and Scanner2 are from the same company, where the
website scanner is marketed as a different product from PCI scanner.
It is the same for Scanner5W and Scanner5.
We conducted the baseline test for the four website scanners.
Note that these web scanners do not produce certificates. The re-
sults are shown in the last four columns of Table 3. Since they are
website scanners, we only expect them to cover web application vul-
nerabilities (Test case 7, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27). Unfortunately, none
of the commercial scanners detect these web application vulnera-
bilities. W3af reported the use of HTTP protocol to communicate
sensitive information (case 7), but missed other web application
vulnerabilities. ZAP detected the SQL injection vulnerability in
the customer login page (case 22), but missed the SQL injection
vulnerability in the admin login page (case 21). Noticeably, ZAP
also missed the XSS vulnerability we implanted (case 27).
Summary of Testbed Findings. The detection capabilities vary
significantly across scanners. Our experiments show that 5 out of
6 PCI scanners are not compliant with the ASV scanning guide-
lines [19] by ignoring detected vulnerabilities and not making them
“automatic failures”. Most of the common web application vulnera-
bilities (e.g., SQL injection, XSS, CSRF) are not detected by the 6 PCI
scanners (only Scanner2 detected CSRF), despite the requirements
of the PCI guidelines. Out of the 4 website scanners, only ZAP
detected one of the two SQL injection cases.
Admittedly, black-box detection of vulnerabilities such as XSS
and SQL injection is difficult. Typical reasons for missed detection
are i) failure to locate the page due to incomplete discovery and/or
ii) that detection heuristics are limited or easily bypassed. In our
testbed, SQL injection vulnerabilities (21, 22) are placed in the login
pages. CSRF vulnerabilities are present in all forms. The scanners
we tested used web crawling with URL fuzzing to detect hidden
pages, URLs, and functions. Often, we are unable to pinpoint the
exact reasons why the tools fail in these cases. Novel detection
techniques, such as guided fuzzing [49] and taint tracking [73],
have been proposed by the research community. Future work is
needed to evaluate their applicability in the specific PCI context.
5 Measurement of Compliant Websites
The alarming security deficiencies in how PCI scanners conduct the
compliance certification motivate us to ask the following questions:
How secure are e-commerce websites? What are the main measurable
vulnerabilities in e-commerce websites?As such we designed another
set of real-world experiments where we aim to measure the security
of e-commerce websites with respect to the PCI DSS guideline. To
do so, we need to address several technical questions.
What Tools to Use? The key enabler of this measurement is a new
tool we developed named PciCheckerLite. We use basic Linux
tools (e.g., nc, openssl) and Java net URL APIs to implement the
system. Below, we focus on the key design concepts of PciCheck-
erLite in order to work with live websites.
What Security Properties to Check? A key requirement of this
experiment tomake sure that we do not disrupt or negatively impact
websites being tested. Out of the 29 externally verifiable cases in Ta-
ble 3, we choose a subset of 17 cases for this experiment, as shown
in Table 5. The sole reason of selecting these cases for PciCheck-
erLite is that we could implement these tests in a non-intrusive
manner, leaving a minimum footprint, i.e., having a minimum im-
pact on the servers. We categorize these cases to high, medium
and low severity based on i) the attacker’s gain and ii) the attack
difficulty. Cases that are immediately exploitable by any arbitrary
attacker to cause large damages are highly severe, for example, the
use of default passwords (Test case 5), insecure communications
(Test cases 7, 12, 13, 16, 17), vulnerable remote access software (Test
case 19), browsable web directories (Test case 22), and supporting
HTTP TRACE method (Test case 23). Cases that substantially ben-
efit any arbitrary attacker but require some efforts to exploit are
marked as medium severity, e.g., test cases 2, 14, 15, 25, 29, and 33.
For example, scripts loaded from external sources can steal payment
card data (Test case 25), but attackers need to craft the malicious
scripts [32]. Low-risk issues are marked as low severity (Test case 3,
18). The categories are consistent with Table 3 as high and medium
severity cases correspond to “must-fix” vulnerabilities. The two
low-severity cases are not required to be fixed to be PCI-compliant.
Implementing PciCheckerLite.Our goal is to minimize the num-
ber of requests that PciCheckerLite issues per test case, while
maximizing the test case coverage. It involves a collection of light-
weight heuristics that merge multiple tests into a single request.
For example, for most of the HTTP-related tests, we reuse a single
response from the server. Test cases 25, 29, and 33 are covered and
resolved by one single HTTP request to retrieve the main page and
analyzing the response header. Test cases 12–18 are covered by
one certificate fetching. For case 30 (browsable directories enabled)
Table 4: Number of e-commerce websites that have at least
one vulnerability and those that have at least one “must-fix”
vulnerability. In total, 1,203 sites are tested including 810
sites chosen from different web categories, and 393 sites cho-
sen from different Alexa ranking ranges.
E-commerce Websites # of Vulnerable Websites
Must-fix Vul. All Vul.
Category (810)
Business (122) 106 113
Shopping (163) 135 143
Arts (78) 66 76
Adults (65) 61 65
Recreation (84) 70 75
Computer (57) 53 56
Games (42) 38 42
Health (60) 54 55
Home (102) 82 93
Kids & Teens (37) 31 36
Ranking (393) Top (288) 235 277Bottom (105) 100 104
Total (1,203) 1,031 (86%) 1,135 (94%)
PciCheckerLite conducts a code-guided probe and avoids crawl-
ing web pages. It discovers file paths in the code of the landing
page and then probes the server with requests for accessing path
prefixes. The implementation details are given in the Appendix.
How to Determine Whether a Website is PCI Compliant? It
is not easy to directly confirm whether a website is DSS compli-
ant or not, unless the website actively advertises this information.
While some cloud and service providers (e.g., Google Cloud [39],
Amazon Connect [12], Shopify [38], and Akamai [37]) advertise
their PCI compliance status, not all of them disclose such informa-
tion. However, as e-commerce websites need to show their DSS
compliance in order to work with acquirer banks (described in Sec-
tion 2), it is reasonable to assume that most websites we evaluated
have successfully passed the external scanning.
Website Selection.We use two different ways to select websites
to increase diversity. First, we downloaded 2,000 Alexa top websites
under 10 categories (200 websites per category) to observe security
compliance differences based on categories. In Table 4, we show the
category-wise breakdown. Among them, we manually identified
810 websites that make payment card transactions. This step is time-
consuming and usually requires manually visiting multiple pages
(e.g., one needs to visit multiple pages to get to the payment page
on nytimes.com). Second, to cover websites of different popularity
levels, we further select the top 500 and bottom 500 websites (1,000
in total) fromAlexa top 1millionwebsite list.We found 288websites
from the top list and 105 websites from the bottom list that accept
payment card information (and do not overlap with the previous
811 websites). In total, 1,203 payment-cards-taking websites are
selected for scanning by PciCheckerLite.
Findings of E-commerce Website Compliance. 68 websites
fully passed our PciCheckerLite test, including the aforemen-
tioned cloud providers (Google Cloud, Amazon Connect, Shopify).
Our results also confirm that a number of actively operating web-
sites do not comply with the PCI Data Security Standard. As shown
in Table 4, out of the 1,203 websites, 1,135 (94%) have at least one
vulnerability. More importantly, 1,031 (86%) sites have at least one
vulnerability that belong to the “must-fix” vulnerabilities which
should have disqualified them as non-compliant. Among them, 520
(43%) sites even have two or more must-fix vulnerabilities.
Then as shown in Table 5, the shopping category has the lowest
percentage (87%) of vulnerable websites, while all other categories
have a percentage of over 90%. We found several types of high-
risk and medium-risk vulnerabilities, including leaving the Mysql
port (3306) open, using self-signed or expired certificates, wrong
hostnames in the certificate, enabling HTTP TRACE method, and
using vulnerable OpenSSH (7.5 or earlier). Supporting TLS v1.0
(low-risk level) is another most common vulnerability we detected
(Test case 18), likely due to the need for backward compatibility.
SSLv3.0 and TLSv1.0 are known to havemultiple man-in-the-middle
vulnerabilities [40] and the PCI standard recommends that all web
servers and clients must transition to TLSv1.1 or above.
The vulnerabilities in these websites suggest the PCI scanners
used by the websites are inadequate and failed to detect the vulner-
abilities during the certification scans. Another possibility is that
the acquiring banks did not sufficiently examine the merchants’
quarterly security reports, allowing merchants to operate without
sending adequate security reports to banks as required.
Vulnerable Websites. Below, we highlight some interesting find-
ings without explicitly mentioning the names of vulnerable sites.
Mysql open ports. 59 websites expose the MySql service for remote
access. For example, two Slovenian websites that sell healthcare
products and car components and a Russian website that sells fur-
naces and stoves all have this vulnerability. We did not detect any
use of default user (root) or no password.
Insecure certificates (self-signed, expired, and insecure modulus). The
use of certificates with wrong hostnames (Figure 3 in Appendix) is
an issue that appears in 3% of the websites. For some websites, the
root cause is not properly configuring HTTPS. For example, one
website accepts payment for donations. Since it does not correctly
set up HTTPS, it uses a default certificate7 for HTTPS (Figure 4 in
Appendix). In some cases, the websites use HTTPS for payment
only while other sensitive content (i.e., items and the cart) are
still sent over HTTP. Because the original domain is not properly
configured to use HTTPS, it presents the default expired certificate
(Figure 5 in Appendix).
Comparisonwith ExistingTool. Finally, we experimentally com-
pared PciCheckerLite with the state-of-the-art web scanner. Note
that existing scanners typically have aggressive pentesting com-
ponents that are not suitable to test live websites. For this experi-
ment, we choose w3af and have to adapt it to a “non-intrusive low-
interactive" version. More specifically, we modify w3af to 1) block
intrusive tests (e.g., XSS, SQL injections), 2) disable URL fuzzing,
and 3) disable the liveliness testing. For scalability, we also utilized
w3af’s programmable APIs (w3af_console) to discard the graphic
user interface. We call this version as customized w3af. For com-
parison, we ran PciCheckerLite and the customized w3af on 100
websites random from the 1203 sites (in Table 5). For reference, we
also ran both tools on our BuggyCart.
7A self-signed certificate comes with the webserver installation.
Table 5: Testing results on 1,203 real-world websites that accept payment card transactions as of May 3, 2019. We reuse the
index numbers of the test cases from Table 3.
Reqs. Test Cases Severity Category (810) Ranking (393) Total (1,203)
Biz.
(122)
Shop.
(163)
Arts
(78)
Adlt.
(65)
Recr.
(84)
Comp.
(57)
Game.
(42)
Hlth.
(60)
Home.
(102)
Kids.
(37)
Top
(288)
Btm.
(105)
1.2 2. Mysql port (3306) detection Medium 3 6 4 2 6 2 3 2 4 0 0 27 59 (5%)
3. OpenSSH available Low 6 15 11 4 13 6 7 8 12 1 6 27 116 (10%)
2.1 5. Default Mysql user/passwd High 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0%)
2.3 7. Sensitive info over HTTP High 12 10 12 10 17 10 8 6 10 5 47 22 169 (14%)
4.1
12. Selfsigned cert presented High 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 9 (1%)
13. Weak Cipher Supported High 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0%)
14. Expired cert presented Medium 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 7 (1%)
15. Wrong hostname in cert Medium 3 1 3 0 6 2 0 2 4 1 0 10 32 (3%)
16. Insecure Modulus High 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 (0.1%)
17. Weak hash in cert High 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0%)
18. TLSv1.0 Supported Low 67 73 53 42 41 40 28 30 67 16 216 71 744 (62%)
6.1 19. OpenSSH vulnerable High 6 14 11 4 13 6 6 8 11 1 6 26 112 (9%)
6.5 25. Missing script integrity check Medium 92 109 54 44 44 32 27 42 66 21 154 75 760 (63%)
6.6
29. Server Info available Medium 26 34 17 17 22 15 17 17 25 11 33 22 256 (21%)
30. Browsable Dir Enabled High 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0%)
31. HTTP TRACE supported High 6 4 3 3 2 5 2 2 6 0 4 6 43 (4%)
33. Security Headers missing Medium 18 38 9 12 14 21 9 7 14 7 114 13 276 (23%)
Table 6: Comparison between PciCheckerLite and the
customized w3af on 100 randomly chosen websites and the
Buggycart testbed.We report the number of vulnerable web-
sites detected and the false positives (FP) among them.
Vulnerabilities 100 Random websites Buggycart
Ours (FP) w3af (FP) Ours w3af
2. Mysql port (3306) detection 5 (0) 0 (0) ✓ ✗
3. OpenSSH available 10 (0) 0 (0) ✓ ✗
5. Default Mysql user/pass 0 (0) 0 (0) ✓ ✗
7. Sensitive info over HTTP 12 (0) 27 (17) ✓ ✓
12. Selfsigned cert presented 2 (0) 2 (0) ✓ ✓
13. Weak Cipher Supported 0 (0) 0 (0) ✓ ✗
14. Expired cert presented 0 (0) 3 (3) ✓ ✓
15. Wrong hostname in cert 3 (0) 2 (1) ✓ ✓
16. Insecure Modulus 0 (0) 0 (0) ✓ ✗
17. Weak hash in cert 0 (0) 0 (0) ✓ ✗
18. TLSv1.0 Supported 63 (0) 0 (0) ✓ ✗
19. OpenSSH vulnerable 10 (0) 0 (0) ✓ ✗
25. Missing script integrity check 72 (1) 55 (10) ✓ ✓
29. Server Info available 19 (0) 81 (62) ✓ ✓
30. Browsable Dir Enabled 0 (0) 0 (0) ✓ ✗
31. HTTP TRACE supported 6 (0) 6 (6) ✓ ✓
33. Security Headers missing 30 (0) 0 (0) ✓ ✗
The results are shown in Table 6. First, we observe that our
system outperforms w3af on Buggycart by detecting all the vulner-
abilities. Second, on the 100 real-world websites, our system also
detected more truly vulnerable websites. Even though w3af flagged
more websites (e.g., Test case 7, 29), manually analysis shows that
a large portion of the alerts are false positives. For example, under
Test case 7, w3af flags a website if Port 80 is open, while PciCheck-
erLite reports a website only if the request is not automatically
redirected to Port 443 (HTTPS). This design of w3af produces 17
false positives. Under Test case 15, w3af flags a website that uses
the certificate for its subdomains (which is not a violation). For Test
case 29, w3af flags websites that expose non-critical information
whereas we only flag the exposure of exploitable information (e.g.,
server and framework version numbers). Note that among all vul-
nerabilities, we only have one FP under Test case 25. This website
is flagged by PciCheckerLite for loading Javascript from a third-
party domain without an integrity check. Manually analysis shows
that the third-party domain and the original website are actually
owned by the same organization. Technically, such information is
beyond what PciCheckerLite can collect.
6 Disclosure and Discussion
Responsible Disclosure.We have fully disclosed our findings to
the PCI Security Standard Council. In May 2019, we shared our
paper with the PCI SSC, and successfully got in touch with an ex-
perienced member of the Security Council. Through productive
exchanges with them, we gained useful insights. i) The Security
Council shared a copy of our paper to the dedicated companies
that host the PCI certification testbeds, who are now aware of our
findings; ii) Preventing scanners from gaming the test is one of their
priorities, for example, by constantly updating their testbeds and
changing the tests; iii) Low interaction constraints make it difficult
to test some vulnerabilities externally (which we also experienced
and aimed to address in our work); iv) The Security Council rou-
tinely removes scanners from the ASV list or warns scanners based
on the feedback sent by ASV consumers; v) Their testbeds exclude
vulnerabilities whose CVSS scores are lower than 4; vi) Payment
brands and acquirer banks need efficient (and automatic) solutions
to inspect PCI DSS compliance reports. Insights ii), iii), and vi)
present interesting research opportunities. In addition, we are in
the process of contacting vulnerable websites. Some notifications
have been sent out to those that failed test case 2 (open Mysql port)
or 19 (vulnerable OpenSSH). Incidentally, we found a few websites
have already fixed their problems, for example Netflix upgraded
the vulnerable SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_7.2p2 (current Netflix.com server
does not show a version number).
Is Improving PCI Certification a Practical Task? From the eco-
nomics point of view, the concept of for-profit security certification
companies may seem like an oxymoron. Intuitively, a scanning ven-
dor might make more money if its scanner is less strict, allowing
websites to easily pass the DSS certification test. On the contrary, a
company offering rigorous certification scanning might lose cus-
tomers when they become frustrated from failing the certification
test. Phenomena with misaligned incentives widely exist in many
security domains (e.g., ATM security, network security) [41]. Fortu-
nately, unlike the decentralized Internet, PCI security is centrally
supervised by the PCI Security Council. Thus, the Council, govern-
ing the process of screening and approving scanner vendors, is a
strong point of quality control. The enforcement can be strength-
ened through technical means. Thus, improving the PCI security
certification, unlike deploying Internet security protocols [69], is a
practical goal that is very reachable in the near future.
Gaming-resistant Self-evolving Testbeds and Open-Source PCI Scan-
ners. A testbed needs to constantly evolve, incorporating new types
of vulnerabilities and relocating existing vulnerabilities over time. A
fixed testbed is undesirable, as scanners may gradually learn about
the test cases and trivially pass the test without conducting a thor-
ough analysis. Automating this process and creating self-evolving
testbeds are interesting open research problems.
Competitive open-source PCI/web scanners from non-profit or-
ganizations could drive up the quality of commercial vendors, forc-
ing the entire scanner industry to catch up, and providing alterna-
tive solutions for merchants to run sanity check on their services.
Currently, there are not many high-quality, open-source and deploy-
able web scanners; w3af and ZAP are among the very few available.
Automate the Workload at Payment Brands and Acquirer Banks.
Payment brands and acquirer banks are the ultimate gatekeepers
in the PCI DSS enforcement chain. Manually screening millions of
scanning reports and questionnaires every quarter is not efficient
(and is likely not being done well in practice). Indeed, our real-world
experiments suggest that the gatekeeping at the acquirer banks
and payment brands appears weak. Thus, automating the report
processing for scalable enforcement is urgently needed.
Scanning vs. Self-assessment Questionnaires. There are four
major types of Self-assessment Questionnaires or SAQs (A toD) [29].
The different SAQs are designed for different types of merchants,
as illustrated in Figure 6 in the Appendix. In SAQs, all the questions
are close ended, i.e., multiple choices. For a vast majority of the
merchants, the current compliance checking largely relies on the
trust of a merchant’s honesty and capability of maintaining a secure
system. This observation is derived from our analysis of the 340
questions in the self-assessment questionnaire (SAQ) D-Mer, which
is an SAQ designed for merchants that process or store cardholder
data. Consequently, it is the most comprehensive questionnaire.
We manually went through all the questions the in Self-
Assessment Questionnaire (SAQ) D-Mer and categorized them into
the five major groups, network security, system security, applica-
tion security, application capability, and company policies. 271 of
the 340 questions fall under the category of company policies and
application capability, where none of them can be automatically
verifiable by an external entity (e.g., ASV/web scanners). Only 31
out of the 69 questions on network, system and application security
are automatically verifiable by a PCI scanner.
Legal Consequences of Cheating in PCI Certification. The
PCI DSS standard is not required by the U.S. federal law. Some state
laws do refer to PCI DSS (e.g., Nevada, Minnesota,Washington) [58],
stating that merchants must be PCI compliant. However, there is
no mentioning about any legal consequences of cheating in the PCI
DSS certification process. Thus, it appears that being untruthful
when filling out the self-assessment questionnaire would not have
any direct legal consequences. The only potential penalty would
be an “after effect”. For example, a merchant may be fined by the
card brand if a data breach happens due to its non-compliance [3].
Limitations. Our work has a few limitations. First, we only tested
6 PCI scanners and 4 web scanners. Given the high expense to
order PCI and web scanning, it is unlikely that such an experiment
can truly scale up. For PCI scanning, we have tried to increase
the diversity of scanner selection by selecting from different price
ranges. The website scanners are added to further increase diver-
sity. Second, our paper primarily focuses on the PCI compliance
certification of e-commerce websites. Although we did not evaluate
the compliance of banks (which report to card brands), we argue
that it is the same set of the approved PCI scanners that provide
the compliance reports for both merchants and banks. The problem
revealed in our study should be generally applicable. Third, we
did not test vulnerabilities that are not yet covered by the current
Data Security Standards (DSS). Future work can further study the
comprehensiveness of DSS. Finally, in Section 5, we only tested
1,203 e-commerce websites because it requires manual efforts to
verify whether a website accepts payment card information. It is
difficult to automate the verification process since one often needs
to register an account and visit many pages before finding the pay-
ment page. We argue that our experiment already covers websites
from various categories and ranking ranges, which is sufficient to
demonstrate the prevalence of the problem.
7 Related Work
Website Scanning. The detection of web application vulnerabili-
ties has been well studied by researchers [45, 49, 73]. In [45, 74], au-
thors measured the performance of several black-box web scanners
and reported a low detection rate for XSS and SQL injection attacks.
The main challenge is to exhaustively discover various web-app
states by observing the input/output patterns. Duchene et al. [53]
proposed an input fuzzer to detect XSS vulnerabilities. Doupé et
al. [49] proposed to guide fuzzing based on the website’s internal
states. In [64], authors proposed a black-box method to detect logi-
cal flaws using network traffic. In [73], authors used a taint-tracking
based detection of XSS vulnerabilities at the client-side. In [65], au-
thors used dynamic execution trace-based behavioral models to de-
tect CSRF vulnerabilities. Although most defenses against XSS and
SQL inject attacks prescribe input sanitization [44, 57, 59], in [51],
authors proposed an application-agnostic rewrite technique to dif-
ferentiate scripts from other HTML inputs. We argue that similar
research efforts could make a positive impact to the PCI community
by (1) producing and releasing high-quality open-sourced tools;
and (2) customizing a non-intrusive version of the tool for testing
production websites in the PCI DSS context.
Proactive Threat Measurements. Honeypots [62, 66] are useful
to collect empirical data on attackers (or defenders). In [56], authors
measure attack behaviors by deploying vulnerable web servers wait-
ing to compromised. In [63], authors deployed phishing websites to
measure the timeliness of browsers’ blacklist mechanisms. In [48],
authors measure the capability of the web hosting providers to
detect compromised websites by deploying vulnerable websites
within those web hosting services. Our testbed can be regarded as
a specialized honeypot to assess the capability of PCI scanners.
Physical Card Frauds. Payment card frauds at ATM or point-of-
sale (POS) machines have been studied for decades [42, 43, 47, 52,
61, 70, 71]. Most of these frauds occur due to stealing payment
card information during physical transactions [35, 42], and cloning
magnetic stripe cards [70, 71]. EMV cards are known to be resistant
to card cloning, but are vulnerable to tempered terminals [52],
or due to protocol-level vulnerabilities [61] and implementation
flaws [47]. Recently, researchers proposed mechanisms to detect
magnetic card skimmers [46, 70].
Digital Card Frauds. In the online setting, the danger of using
magnetic-stripe-like transactions is known for years [8, 21]. Various
methods (e.g., 3D-Secure [24], Tokenization framework [13]) have
been proposed to fix it. Unfortunately, 3D-Secure is found to be
inconvenient and easy to break [60]. Tokenization framework offers
a great alternative by replacing original card information with tem-
porary tokens during a transaction. However, card information can
still be stolen during account setup phase at a poorly secured mer-
chant. Other unregulated digital financial services are also reported
to be insecure [68]. In [68], the authors showed that branchless
banking apps that leverage cellular networks to send/receive cashes
are also vulnerable due to flaws such as skipping SSL/TLS certificate
validation, and using insecure cryptographic primitives.
8 Conclusion
Our study shows that the PCI data security standard (PCI DSS) is
comprehensive, but there is a big gap between the specifications and
their real-world enforcement. Our testbed experiments revealed
that the vulnerability screening capabilities of some approved scan-
ning vendors (ASV) are inadequate. 5 of the 6 PCI scanners are not
compliant with the ASV scanning guidelines. All 6 PCI scanners
would certify e-commerce websites that remain vulnerable. Our
measurement on 1,203 e-commerce websites shows that 86% of
the websites have at least one type of vulnerability that should
disqualify them as non-compliant. Our future work is to a design
minimum-footprint black-box scanning method.
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Appendix
Figure 3: An example of wrong hostname in the certificate.
The domain (a*****.***) uses a certificate that is issued for a
different domain name (*.n*****.***).
Figure 4: Self-signed certificate used by (r*****.***), a website
that accepts payment cards for donations.
Figure 5: (u*****.***) uses expired certificates by default and
redirects users to a secure sub-domain with proper certifi-
cate during payment.
Self-assessment questionaire A
(SAQ A)
Self-assessment questionaire D-Mer
(SAQ D-Mer)
Self-assessment questionaire A-EP
(SAQ A-EP)
Doesn't Touch
Cardholder Data
Doesn't Store
Cardholder Data
Process or Store
Cardholder Data
E-commerce Type Relevant SAQ
Figure 6: Self-Assessment Questionnaires (SAQs) for differ-
ent types of e-commerce merchants.
Implementation Details of PciCheckerLite
PciCheckerLite follows a series of rules for vulnerability testing.
The index of the rules matches with the testing cases discussed in
the paper. As described in the paper, we only focus on a subset of
test cases that do not disrupt or cause any negative impact to the
remote servers (for ethical considerations). The implementation
details are as follows.
Rule 2. Database port detection. For database port detection, we
choose to probe for Mysql port8. The reason for choosing Mysql
port are i) Mysql is among the top three (Mysql, Oracle, Microsoft
SQL Server) most popular databases in the world [34]; ii) Mysql is
free; and iii) it supports a wide range of programming languages.
The access to Mysql port (e.g., 3306) is disabled by default. It is
very dangerous to enable remote access to Mysql database for an
arbitrary client. We check the Mysql port using nc [36], which
is a Unix utility tool that reads and writes data across network
connections using the TCP or UDP protocol.
Rule 5. Default Mysql user/password detection. If the Mysql database
of a website is remotely accessible, we further check for the default
username and password. A typical Mysql installation has a user
“root” with an empty password, unless it is otherwise customized or
disabled. As such, we run a Mysql client to connect to the remote
host using the default username and password. PciCheckerLite
terminates the connection immediately and raises an alert if the
attempt is successful.
Rules 3 & 19. Checking OpenSSH’s availability and version. We use
nc [36] to connect with port 22 of the remote OpenSSH server. If
8We do not probe for multiple ports to avoid suspicions for possible port scanning.
However, a similar technique can be used to probe for other databases.
OpenSSH runs on port 22, then it will return the server informa-
tion (e.g., OpenSSH version, OS type, OS version). We parse the
returned information to determine the version of the OpenSSH
server. We consider any installation versions before OpenSSH_7.6
as vulnerable.
Rules 29 & 33. Checking HTTP header information. Extracting
HTTP information does not require the rich browser functionality.
We use Java net URL APIs to open HTTP connections for
extracting HTTP headers. For case 29, we raise a warning only
if we detect that the “Server” header contains server name
and version. For case 33, we raise a warning if any of the four
security header (i.e., X-Frame-Options, X-XSS-Protection,
Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options) is
missing.
Rule 7. Sensitive information over HTTP. We tested whether all the
HTTP traffic is redirected to HTTPS by default. We open an HTTP
connection with the server and follow the redirection chain. If the
server doesn’t redirect to HTTPS, we raise an alert. We use Java
net URL APIs to implement this test case.
Rules 18 & 13. TLSv1.0 and weak cipher negotiation. We use
OpenSSL’s s_client tool to establish a SSL/TLS connection using
TLSv1.0 protocol. PciCheckerLite raises a warning if the connec-
tion is successful. We also use s_client to negotiate the ciphersuite
with the remote server. PciCheckerLite raises a warning if we suc-
cessfully negotiate with a ciphersuite that contains a weak cipher
(i.e., IDEA, DES, MD5).
Rules 12, 14, 15, 16 & 17. Retrieving and examining the certificate.We
use OpenSSL’s s_client tool to retrieve the SSL certificate of a remote
server. To parse the certificate, we use APIs from java.security.cert
package. To check whether a certificate is self-signed (Case 12), we
used the public key of the certificate to verify the certificate itself. To
check whether the certificate is expired, we use the checkValidity()
method of X509Certificate API (Case 14). If the subject domainname
(DN) or any alternate DN of a certificate doesn’t match with the
server domainname, then PciCheckerLite raises an alert (Case
15). Regarding the public key sizes for factoring modulus (e.g., RSA,
DSA), the discrete logarithm (e.g., Diffie-Hellman), and the elliptic
curve (e.g., ECDSA) based algorithms, NIST recommends them to
be 2048, 224 and 224 bits, respectively [33]. PciCheckerLite raises
alert if the key size is smaller than what is recommended (Case 16).
If the signing algorithm uses any of the weak hashing algorithms
(e.g., MD5, SHA, SHA1, SHA-1), PciCheckerLite raises warnings
(Case 17).
Rule 25. Script source integrity check. A website is expected to check
the integrity of any JavaScript code that is loaded externally to
the browser. To enable script source integrity check, a server can
use the “integrity” attribute of the script tag. In the “integrity” at-
tribute, the server should mention the hashing algorithm and the
hash value of the script that should be used to check the integrity.
PciCheckerLite downloads the index page of a website. After that,
it collects all the script tags, and checks if the script tags contain any
external URL (excluding the website’s CDN URLs). Then it looks
for the integrity attribute for the scripts loaded from external URLs,
and raises alert if the integrity attribute is missing. We only perform
this test for the index page (instead of all the pages) of a website
The card verification code or value (three digit or four-
digit number printed on the front or back of a payment
card) is not stored after authorization?
Yes
Yes
with
CCW No N/A
Not
Tested
2 2 2 2 2
Figure 7: A sample question from the Self-Assessment Questionnaire D (SAQ D) [28]. “Yes with CCW” means “the expected
testing has been performed, the requirement has beenmet with the assistance of a compensating control, and a Compensating
Control Worksheet (CCW) is required to be submitted along with the questionnaire” .
to keep the test lightweight. The number of vulnerable websites
detected by this test can only be interpreted as a lower bound.
Rule 30. Checking for browsable directories.We check whether the
directories are browsable in a website. To avoid redundant traffic,
we reuse the collected JavaScript script URLs for case 25. We then
examine the common parent directory of all the internal URLs. Fi-
nally, we send a GET request to fetch the content of the directory.
If directory browsing is enabled, the server will return a response
with code 200 with a page containing the listing of files and direc-
tories of the specified path. Otherwise, it should return an error
response code (e.g., 404 - not found, 403 - Forbidden). This test only
determines if a directory is browsable. We never store any of the
returned pages during the test.
Rule 31. HTTP TRACE supported. HTTP TRACE method is used for
diagnostic purposes. If it is enabled, the web server will respond
to a request by echoing in its response the exact request that it
has received. In [55], the author has shown that HTTP TRACE can
be used to steal sensitive information (e.g., cookie, credentials). To
examine the HTTP TRACE configuration, we send a HTTP request
by setting the method to TRACE. If the TRACE method is enabled
by the server, the server will echo the request in the response with
a code 200.
Table 7: A summary of the guidelines for ASV scanners [19]. In the fourth column, we show the categories that are required
to be fixed. “∗" means that in the SSL/TLS category, all the vulnerabilities are required to be fixed, except case 18.
Target Component Expectation Test-cases Must fix?
Firewalls and Routers 1. Must scan all network devices such as firewalls and external routers.2. Must test for known vulnerabilities and patches. 1 Yes
Operating Systems 1. Must scan to determine the OS type and version.2. An unsupported OS must be marked as an automatic failure. - Yes
Database Servers 1. Must test for open access to databases from the Internet.2. If found - must be marked as an automatic failure (Req. 1.3.6) 2 Yes
Web Servers 1. Must be able to test for all known vulnerabilities and configuration issues.2. Report if directory browsing is observed. 30 Yes
Application Servers 1. Must be able to test for all known vulnerabilities and configuration issues. 29, 33 Yes
Common Web Scripts 1. Must be able to find common web scripts (e.g., CGI, e-commerce, etc.). - Yes
Built-in Accounts 1. Look for default username/passwords in routers, firewalls, OS and web or DB servers.2. Such vulnerability must be marked as an automatic failure. (Req 2.1) 5, 6 Yes
DNS and Mail Servers
1. Must be able to detect the presence
2. Must test for known vulnerabilities and configuration issues
3. Report if a vulnerability is observed (automatic failure for DNS server vulnerabilities).
- Yes
Virtualization components 1. Must be able to test for all known vulnerabilities - Yes
Web Applications
Must find common vulnerabilities (automatically/manually) including the following:
1. Unvalidated parameters that might lead to SQL injection.
2. Cross-site scripting (XSS) flaws
3. Directory traversal vulnerabilities
4. HTTP response splitting/header injection
5. Information leakage: phpinfo(), Insecure HTTP methods, detailed error msg
6. If found any of the above must be marked as an automatic failure
21, 22, 23,
24, 25, 26, 27,
28, 31, 32
Yes
Other Applications 1. Must test for known vulnerabilities and configuration issues 20 Yes
Common Services 1. Must test for known vulnerabilities and configuration issues 19 Yes
Wireless Access Points 1. Must be able to detect wireless access points2. Must test and report known vulnerabilities and configuration issues - Yes
Backdoors/Malware 1. Must test for remotely detectable backdoors/malware2. Report automatic failure if found one - Yes
SSL/TLS
Must find:
1. Various version of crypto protocols
2. Detect the encryption algorithms and encryption key strengths
3. Detect signing algorithms used for all server certificates
4. Detect and report on certificate validity
5. Detect and report on whether CN matches the hostname
6. Mark as failure if supports SSL or early versions of TLS.
12-18 Yes∗
Anonymous Key agreement
Protocol
1. Must identify protocols allowing anonymous/non-authenticated cipher suites
2. Report if found one - Yes
Remote Access
1. Must be able to detect remote access software
2. Must report if one is detected.
3. Must test and report known vulnerabilities and configuration issues
3, 4
19, 20 Yes
Point-of-sale (POS) Software 1. Should look for POS software2. If found - ask for justification - No
Embedded links or code
from out-of-scope domains
1. Should look for out-of-scope links/code
2. If found - ask for justification - No
Insecure Services/
industry-deprecated protocols 1. If found one - ask for justification - No
Unknown services 1. Should look for unknown services and report if found - No
Table 8: Specifications defined by the PCI Security Standard Council (SSC) along with their targets, evaluators, assessors and
whether it is enforced by SSC. “COTS" stands for Commercial Off-The-Shelf.
PCI Specifications Target(s) Evaluator(s) Assessor(s): Type Required?
Data Security Standard (DSS) [27]
Merchant, Acquirer Bank, Issuer Bank,
Token Service Provider,
Service Provider
Acquirer,
Payment Brand
QSA: Manual
ASV: Automated Yes
Card Production and Provisioning (CPP) [17, 18]
Card Issuer,
Card Manufacturer,
Token Service Provider
Payment Brand CPP-QSA: Manual Yes
Payment Application DSS (PA DSS) [9] PA Vendors PA-QSA PA-QSA: Manual Optional
Point-to-Point Encryption (P2PE) [6] POS Device Vendors P2PE-QSA P2PE-QSA: Manual Optional
PIN Transaction Security (PTS) [10, 30] PIN Pad Vendors PTS Labs PTS Labs: Manual Optional
3-D Secure (3DS) [16]
3DS Server,
3DS Directory Server,
3DS Access Control Server
Payment Brand 3DS-QSA: Manual Optional
Software-Based PIN Entry on COTS (SPoC) [31] PIN-based Cardholder verification method (CVM) Apps SPoC Labs SPoC Labs: Manual Optional
Token Service Provider (TSP) [7] Token Service Providers P2PE-QSA P2PE-QSA: Manual Optional
Table 9: PCI DSS requirements are presented with expected testing (from SAQ D-Mer) and the potential test-cases that can be
used to evaluate the ASV scanning.
No. Requirement Expected Testing Testcase
1.1 Formalize testing when firewall configurations change 1. Review current network diagram2. Examine network configuration N/A
1.2 Build a firewall to restrict "untrusted" trafficto cardholder data environment
1. Review firewall and router config
2. Examine firewall and router config 1. Enable/disable firewall.
1.3 Prohibit direct public access between Internetand cardholder data environment 1. Examine firewall and router config
2. Expose Mysql to the Internet
3. SSH over public Internet
4. Remote access to PhpMyadmin
1.4 Install a firewall on computers that have connectivityto the Internet and organization’s network 1. Examine employee owned-devices N/A
2.1 Always change vendor-supplied defaults beforeinstalling a System on the network
1. Examine vendor documentations
2. Observe system configurations
5. Use default DB user/password
6. Use default Phpmyadmin user/password
2.2 Develop a configuration standards for all systemcomponents that address all known security vulnerabilities.
1. Examine vendor documentations
2. Observe system configurations N/A
2.3
Encrypt using Strong cryptography all non-console
administrative access such as browser/web-based
management tools
1. Examine system components
2. Examine system configurations
3. Observe an administrator log on
7. Sensitive information over HTTP
2.4 Shared hosting providers must also complywith PCI DSS requirements 1. Examine system inventory N/A
3.1 Establish cardholder data retention and disposal policies 1. Review data retention and disposal policies N/A
3.2 Do not store sensitive authentication data(even it is encrypted)
1. Examine system configurations
2. Examine deletion processes 8. Store CVV in DB
3.3 Mask PAN when displayed 1. Examine system configurations2. Observe displays of PAN 9. Show unmask PAN
3.4 Render PAN unreadable anywhere it is stored
1. Examine data repositories
2. Examine removable media
3. Examine audit logs
10. Store plain-text PAN (OpenCart)
3.5 Secure keys that are used to encrypt storedcardholder data or other keys
1. Examine system configurations
2. Examine key storage locations 11. Use hardcoded key for encrypting PAN
3.6 Document all key-management process 1. Review key-management procedures N/A
4.1 Use strong cryptography and security protocolsduring transmission of cardholder data. 1. Review system configurations
12. Use self-signed certificate
13. Use insecure block cipher
14. Use Expired certificate
15. Use cert. with wrong hostname
16. Use 1024 bit DH modulus.
17. Use weak hash in SSL certificate
18. Use TLSv1.0
4.2 Never send PAN over unprotected usermessaging technologies. 1. Review policies and procedures N/A
5.1 Deploy anti-virus software on all systems 1. Examine system configurations 2. Interview personnel N/A
5.2 Ensure all anti-virus mechanisms are current,running and generating audit log
1. Examine anti-virus configurations
2. Review log retention process
3. Examine system configurations
N/A
6.1 Ensure that all system components are protectedfrom known vulnerabilities
1. Examine system components
2. Compare the list of security patches
19. Use vulnerable of OpenSSH
20. Use vulnerable PhpMyadmin
6.2 Establish a process to identify and assign riskto newly discovered security vulnerabilities 1. Review policies and procedures N/A
6.3 Develop software applications in accordancewith PCI DSS and industry best practices 1. Review software development process N/A
6.4 Follow change control processes and proceduresfor all changes to system components 1. Review change control process N/A
6.5 Develop applications based on secure codingguidelines and review custom application code 1. Review software-development policies
21. Implant SQL injection in admin login
22. Implant SQL injection in customer login
23. Disable password retry limit
24. Disable restriction on password length.
25. Use JS from external source insecurely
26. Do not hide program crashes
27. Implant XSS
28. Implant CSRF
6.6 Ensure all public-facing applications areprotected against known attacks 1. Examine system configuration
29. Present server info in security Headers.
30. Browsable web directories.
31. Enable HTTP Trace/Track
32. Enable phpinfo()
33. Disable security headers
7 Restrict access to cardholder databased on roles
1. Examine access control policy
2. Review vendor documentation
3. Examine system configuration
4. Interview personnel
N/A
8.49 Render all passwords unreadable during storageand transmission for all system components 1. Examine system configuration
34. Store unsalted customer passwords
35. Store plaintext passwords
9 Restrict physical access to cardholder data
1. Observe process
2. Review policies and procedures
3. Interview personnel
N/A
10 Track and monitor all access to networkresource and cardholder data
1. Interview personnel
2. Observe audit logs
3. Examine audit log settings
N/A
11 Regularly test security systems and processes
1. Interview personnel
2. Examine scope of testing
3. Review results of ASV scans
N/A
12 Maintain a policy that addresses informationsecurity for all personnel
1. Review formal risk assessment
2. Review security policy
3. Interview personnel.
N/A
9 Other requirements under 8 are not testable.
